Summary

Warehouse Fire, New Orleans, Louisiana
March 21, 1996

NFPA Report by Ed Comeau

Summary

Two fires occurred in an occupied, operational general merchandise warehouse on March 21, 1996 in New Orleans, Louisiana. The building, which was completed in 1991, occupied 1,134,770 square feet (105,420 m2), with the warehouse area measuring 930,020 square feet (86,400 m2). The height of the building in the high-bay rack area was 72 feet (22 m).

The warehouse contained a combination of high racks measuring 65 feet (20 m) high and low racks measuring 21 feet to 30 feet (6.4 m to 9 m) high. The high racks were all equipped with in-rack sprinklers, while not all of the low racks were equipped with in-rack sprinkler systems.

In addition to the racks, the main warehouse area housed a variety of conveyor systems and a mechanized retrieval system.

The building was equipped with 30 overhead sprinkler systems and 17 in-rack sprinkler systems. The facility was supplied by a 10-inch (25-cm) looped water main connected to a 20-inch (51-cm) municipal water main. A 300,000 gallon (1,135,600 L) water tank provided an additional water supply. Two 2,500 gpm (9,462 L/min) fire pumps, one electric and one diesel, were connected to the fire protection system. The electric pump was connected to the municipal water supply while the diesel pump was connected to the water tank.

A fire alarm system monitored the sprinkler systems, valves, and fire pumps. Alarm and trouble signals were transmitted to an on-site security office that was continually monitored. Alarm signals were transmitted to an off-premise supervising station that was responsible for notifying the fire department.

There were no fire separations in the general warehouse and distribution area.

At the time of the fire, there were 15 employees in the building. The initial fire occurred between 5:00 and 5:30 a.m. and originated in an area of 21-foot (6.4-m) high portable racks that were not protected by in-rack sprinklers. The racks contained wicker baskets and plastic lawn chairs. The fire spread to adjacent portable racks. Once discovering the fire, employees tried unsuccessfully to extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers followed by occupant-use fire hoses. The overhead sprinkler system that was located approximately 50 feet (15 m) above the top level of the racks activated, but did not extinguish or control the fire. The fire was extinguished by the fire department using an interior attack. Five alarms were required to bring the fire under control. Several fire department crews were left on the scene to continue overhaul and assist in the fire investigation.

Once fire control had been achieved, all of the sprinkler systems in the facility were manually shut down by closing the individual OS&Y valves on the risers.

This fire was determined to be incendiary in nature. The arsonist used existing fuel packages to light the fire and no signs of accelerants were detected during the investigation.

A second fire occurred at approximately 2:00 p.m. in an area remote from the original fire. This fire broke out in the high rack storage area in the south-central portion of the building. When this fire occurred, employees immediately began to turn the sprinkler systems back on. The sprinkler systems were not able to control the fire, and the warehouse and distribution area were totally destroyed.

The portion of the building separated from the main warehouse area by the fire separation wall received no damage from the initial fire, and relatively minor smoke and water damage from the second fire.

The following were found to be major contributing factors to this loss:

  • Excessive clearance between the ceiling sprinklers and the top of the storage racks in the area of fire origin for the first fire.
  • Lack of in-rack sprinkler systems.
  • Shutting off all of the sprinkler systems in the building following the first fire.
  • Restoration of electrical service without evaluating the damage to the electrical system. This action was determined to have caused the second fire.
  • Lack of a fire separation wall within the 930,020 square foot (86,400 m2) warehouse.

This fire has highlighted areas that perhaps could be further addressed by research and in NFPA documents in order to avoid a future occurrence of such a catastrophic fire.

© 1996 National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA
 
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