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Summary
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Earthquake, Kobe,
Japan
6,000 People Killed
January 17, 1995
NFPA Report by Ed Comeau
Summary
On Tuesday, January 17, 1995, at 5:46 a.m. (Japan
Standard Time), a 20-second earthquake measuring 6.8 on the
Richter Scale occurred near the Japanese port of Kobe, about
500 km (311 mi) southwest of Tokyo. The quake, which was an
order of magnitude larger than the Northridge Earthquake in
January 1994, killed more than 6,000 people, injured at
least 30,000, and left more than 300,000 people homeless.
More than 100,000 buildings were severely damaged or
destroyed by the quake and the fires it caused. 148 separate
fires destroyed 6,513 buildings and an area of 624,671 m2
(0.24 sq mi). The total dollar loss, including damage to
buildings, transportation systems, and other portions of the
infrastructure, has been estimated between ¥13 trillion
and ¥20 trillion (U.S. $147 billion and U.S. $200
billion).
This earthquake was the worst to hit Japan since the 1923
Tokyo-Yokohama earthquake, which had an estimated Richter
magnitude of 7.9 and resulted in nearly 143,000 deaths,
primarily due to fire. The last Japanese earthquake to kill
more than 1,000 people was the Fukui earthquake in 1948.
Several factors influenced the spread of fire immediately
after the earthquake and in the days that followed. For
example, many of the structures involved were built of
lightweight wood or bamboo covered with a thin layer of
stucco that was not well secured. Even if a building did not
collapse, it often lost its outer layer of stucco. When this
happened, the underlying wood materials were exposed,
creating a large combustible fuel load.
Many residential structures were not adequately
reinforced laterally, which resulted in either significant
damage or collapse. When a structure did collapse, it
generally left a pile of very combustible material in the
street in front of it. Because the streets in the Kobe area
are narrow, these piles eventually ran together, resulting
in continuous debris from one side of the street to the
other. This allowed fires to spread uninhibited.
More than 50 percent of the fires that were identified as
having been caused by the earthquake occurred three hours or
more after the quake hit. This is significant because a
number of these fires can probably be attributed to ignition
sources that might have been prevented or controlled. For
example, electrical service was sometimes restored without
isolating damaged areas. People used open fires to warm
themselves or to cook food, and some left candles at
shrines. Some fires were started by arsonists.
Unfortunately, the Kobe water supply was compromised very
quickly by a large number of breaks in the distribution
system that rendered the entire water supply useless within
hours. The 971 underground cisterns located throughout the
city that were meant to be used for emergency fire fighting
operations were either blocked by debris, preventing fire
fighting apparatus from reaching them, or they were damaged
and lost all their water through leakage.
As for sprinkler systems, local experts say that they are
not commonly used. Even when they were, they were often so
badly damaged that they were not functional. In one hospital
that did have a sprinkler system, the fifth floor suffered a
pancake collapse that rendered the entire system inoperable.
Many high-rise apartment buildings were equipped with a
number of standpipe systems, but the quake frequently offset
these buildings at street level by several inches, and it is
assumed that the underground piping was severely
damaged.
The lack of water supply and the limited access via
roadways caused by the widespread structural collapse
severely hampered fire fighting operations. In several
cases, buildings were saved by citizens who formed bucket
brigades to stop fires from destroying them.
One factor that may have actually mitigated the spread of
fire after the earthquake was the type of heating system
found in many Japanese homes. Japanese families often use
kerosene heaters, which they commonly turn off in the
evening. Since the earthquake occurred early in the morning,
it is assumed that many of the heaters had not been turned
back on. This helped reduce the number of potential ignition
sources.
Another mitigating factor was the wind speed, which was
relatively low at the time of the earthquake and for the
three days immediately afterward. This helped to limit the
spread of fire.
Building design was also a significant factor in limiting
fire spread in several instances. Three types of occupancies
in particular fared well: gasoline stations, power
substations, and schools. In all three, a combination of
noncombustible perimeter walls, and a lack of penetrations
in the structure or open areas surrounding the building
helped limit the spread of fire.
This report deals with the fire and emergency response to
the disaster. It is based on a number of sources, including
the personal observations of Ed Comeau, Chief Fire
Investigator of the National Fire Protection Association's
Fire Investigation Department. Comeau spent five days in
Kobe as part of a multidisciplinary U.S. team that operates
under the auspices of the UJNR (U.S.-Japan Cooperative
Program in Natural Resources), coordinated by Dr. Riley
Chung of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). The team's 18 members were drawn from several
specialties, including lifelines/geotechnical, buildings,
fire, seismology/geology, and transportation. During the
site survey, Comeau was teamed with Dan Madrzykowski from
the Building Fire Research Institute, a part of NIST. The
team obtained a large amount of fire-related information
from Dr. Yoshiteru Murosaki, a professor in the Engineering
Department of Kobe University, who formed teams of graduate
students immediately following the earthquake to survey
fire-damaged areas in an effort to ascertain what had
happened and to collate the data.
Although this earthquake has been referred to by several
different names, including the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the
Great Hanshin Earthquake, the Hyogo-Ken Nanbu Earthquake,
the South Hyogo Prefecture Earthquake, and the Kobe
Earthquake, it will be referred to as the Kobe Earthquake
for the remainder of this report.
©
1995 National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA
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