English Channel Tunnel
Fire
November 18, 1996
NFPA Report by Ed Comeau
Summary
The fire occurred on a 29-car shuttle traveling from
France to the United Kingdom on Monday, November 18, 1996 at
8:45 p.m., UK time. (NOTE: There is a 1-hour time difference
between Folkestone, UK and Coquelles, France. For
consistency, all times quoted will be UK time.) The shuttle
that was involved was a Heavy Goods Vehicle shuttle, or an
HGV, which transports lorries (cargo trucks). The carrier
wagons on which these lorries are conveyed are covered with
a solid roof, and the sides are open lattice.
The tunnel is 50.45 kilometers long (31.35 miles), and
runs from Folkestone in the United Kingdom, to Coquelles,
France and is operated by a private corporation, Eurotunnel.
It is configured with two running tunnels which run in
parallel (each tunnel is referred to as the north running
tunnel and the south running tunnel) and measure 7.6 meters
(25 feet) in diameter each. A service tunnel runs between
the two running tunnels. It is connected to the running
tunnels by 270 cross passages located every 375 meters
(1,230 feet). The service tunnel measures 4.8 meters (16
feet) in diameter. The depth of the tunnel beneath the
seabed varies from 45 meters to 75 meters (150 feet to 250
feet).
The fire was reported to have occurred in a carrier wagon
at the rear of the train. According to personnel from the
French Fire Brigade, the fire was observed as the train was
entering the tunnel. This report was relayed to the Railway
Control Center (RCC), and the decision was made to have the
train continue towards the UK where the fire would be
extinguished when it emerged, per pre-existing standard
operating procedures. This information was relayed to the
driver of the train.
There are emergency response teams stationed at each end
of the tunnel that are referred to as the First Line of
Response, or FLOR. The FLOR from the French side began
responding immediately through the service tunnel. The
United Kingdom team was notified initially, but a response
was not requested. However, the UK FLOR elected to begin
responding towards the midpoint of the tunnel via the
service tunnel in the event that they were needed.
During the passage through the tunnel, the driver of the
train received a warning light on his control panel that
indicated that there was an abnormality in the train that
may cause a derailment. Standard operating procedures
require that the train be stopped until such a condition can
be verified, and he was able to bring the front of the train
to a controlled stop at marker 4131, approximately 19
kilometers (12 miles) into the tunnel from the terminal at
Coquelles.
The Chef de Train (CdT), who is in overall charge of the
train, then opened an exterior door on the club car to
determine what was wrong, and smoke immediately entered the
club car, which was occupied by 33 people. He then closed
the door, but it was reported that the smoke was so heavy
that people were required to lie on the floor in order to
breathe.
According to UK fire officials, the CdT then proceeded to
evacuate the passengers and crew from the club car and into
the cross passage.
The French FLOR arrived on the scene and assumed command.
A passenger train traveling in the opposite tunnel was
stopped and the uninjured passengers were placed on it.
The UK FLOR arrived on the scene while the French FLOR
was treating the injured victims. After a brief consultation
between the officers of the French and UK FLORs, it was
decided that the French would continue to treat the victims
while the UK personnel sent a crew into the tunnel to
evaluate the fire.
The door at the cross passage at marker 4131 was used to
gain access to the tunnel. By this time the Supplementary
Ventilation System (SVS), which can control the direction
and volume of the airflow within the tunnel, had been
activated and air was being directed from the front of the
train towards the rear (UK side towards the French side).
Personnel from the UK FLOR entered the running tunnel and
verified that the club car and locomotive did not contain
any additional trapped victims. They then proceeded towards
the rear of the train to evaluate the conditions.
Meanwhile, the victims who were being treated in the
service tunnel were transported by ambulance vehicles
through the service tunnel to the French terminal.
Additional fire-fighting resources from the French side
arrived, and a French command officer assumed command of the
incident and declared it a bi-national emergency. (Per the
pre-established bi-national plans for the Tunnel, any
incident which occurred within a country's territory would
be commanded by that country's personnel. This incident was
well within the French boundary.)
Through an oversight, the UK second line of response
(SLOR) was not notified of the fire until 10:02 p.m. At
approximately 10:19 p.m., the UK SLOR was responding via the
service tunnel. The SLOR for both countries is comprised of
fire fighting resources that respond from stations located
outside of the respective terminals. The command officer who
served as the UK liaison with the French incident commander
responded as part of the SLOR.
A consultation was held between the French and United
Kingdom command officers, and it was decided that the French
would attack the fire from cross passage 4163 and that the
UK FLOR would attack the fire from cross passage 4201. This
strategy would allow the French FLOR to attack the fire from
"upstream" and the UK FLOR to attack the fire from the
middle. It was felt that if the fire was attacked from only
upstream, they would not be able to gain effective fire
control within an acceptable period of time. This was based
on the fact that few crews could actually be placed within
the tunnel because of space limitations.
UK personnel were positioned at the cross passage door at
4201, which was then manually opened. The air pressure in
the service tunnel was being maintained at a higher level
than the air pressure in the running tunnel, which resulted
in a very high airflow through the open cross passage door
into the running tunnel. This airflow was so strong that it
was necessary for personnel to brace themselves as the door
was opened and to ensure that they did not have any loose
equipment, which would have been blown into the tunnel as
the door was opened.
In addition to the airflow in the service tunnel, the
ventilation system in the running tunnel had been increased
and was blowing from the UK side to towards the French side
(west to east). The airflow in the running tunnel, coupled
with the airflow coming out of the cross passage, created a
"bubble" that measured approximately 1 meter (3.2 feet) out
of the cross passage into the running tunnel. Within this
bubble it was possible to stand in relative comfort and
safety. However, once personnel passed beyond this boundary,
there was intense heat and smoke which required that all
personnel wear full protective equipment.
Hose lines were connected into the service tunnel's wall
hydrant and advanced into the running tunnel. Initial
fire-fighting efforts focused on extinguishing the fire
directly in front of this cross passage door. Once this was
achieved, personnel then turned to the east and began
advancing hoselines towards the rear of the train. Attempts
were made to advance lines down the walkway on the north
side of the train, through the train itself, and on a
smaller maintenance walkway on the south side of the train.
Due to the extreme heat, crews were able to work for only
about 8 minutes before having to retreat and be replaced by
fresh crews.
It was extremely difficult to advance the lines. Large
amounts of concrete were spalling off explosively from the
tunnel lining due to its exposure to the fire. This resulted
in very fine concrete rubble collecting on the access
walkway, which had the consistency of large grains of sand
and made the footing very difficult. In addition, this
concrete rubble was hot, and a number of fire fighters
reported that the soles of their feet were becoming hot
while standing on this rubble. Furthermore, the fire
fighters were being regularly bombarded on their helmets by
the debris as it fell off of the tunnel lining.
The debris was also collecting on the roof of the HGV
transporters, which ultimately collapsed in a "V" shape due
to the weight of the material.
Two lines were being advanced from the UK position, while
five or six lines were being advanced from the French
position. It was reported that there was insufficient water
pressure and volume to maintain an aggressive attack until
Eurotunnel engineers reconfigured the water supply
approximately 6 hours into the incident.
Fire control was reported at 5:00 a.m. on the following
day, and the fire was reported to have been extinguished at
11:15 a.m.
A total of eight HGV transporters and their contents were
completely destroyed, as well as a loader and the rear
locomotive. Significant damage occurred to the tunnel lining
for approximately 200 meters (656 feet), with serious damage
to an additional 200 meters (656 feet).
According to reports from the Kent Fire Brigade,
approximately 406 millimeters (16 inches) of concrete was
destroyed in some areas, leaving only 51 millimeters (2
inches) of concrete remaining.
No injuries to fire fighters from either country were
reported.
The fire resulted in passenger service interruption for
15 days. Freight trains started running through the
undamaged tunnel again on November 21, 1996. Eurostar
(passenger trains that operated between London and Paris)
service was allowed to resume on December 4, 1996. Tourist
shuttles (cars only) between Folkestone and Coquelles were
allowed to begin service on a limited basis on December 10,
1996. Tourist shuttles carrying coaches started running
again on January 6, 1997
© 1995 National Fire Protection Association, Quincy,
MA
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