Article
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This article appeared in the May, 1999, issue of
the UK magazine, Fire
International
© 1999 writer-tech.com All rights
reserved.
Action required to reduce US firefighter fatalities
Ed Comeau
In 1997, the most current year that there are statistics
available from the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA), 94 fire fighters lost their lives. This is a
continuing downward trend that has been occurring over the
past 20 years, with a high of 171 deaths in 1978, to a low
of 75 in 1992. Except for 1994, where there were 104
fatalities, the number of fire fighters killed has been
under 100 for the past five years.
In reviewing several incidents over the past few years,
there are some common factors that emerged that contributed
to the deaths. These included: communications, freelancing,
building construction, fire fighter health and risk/benefit
analysis. Considering this limited review, it is not
possible to make valid assumptions that these are common
factors to the broader number of fire fighter fatalities.
These are not the only common factors noted, either.
However, these are some very important points and "lessons
learned" to be gleaned from these incidents.
Communications
Effective communications is critical on the fire ground.
The incident commander cannot be everywhere and must rely on
others to report the layout of the building, the fire
conditions and to provide ongoing progress reports so that a
strategic plan can be made. Without this ongoing flow of
information, it is difficult, if not impossible, to develop
a plan that takes into account all of the critical factors
that will assure a safe operation.
A tragic example of a breakdown in communications
occurred in Seattle,
Washington, in 1995 where four fire fighters lost their
lives to a fire in a warehouse.
To help facilitate fire ground communications, every fire
fighter in Seattle was equipped with a portable radio.
Ironically, much of the communication that took place on the
fire ground was "face-to-face," or not over the radios.
The fire building was built on a sloping grade, creating
a confusing layout. The first-in crews, who entered from the
front door, thought they were on the main floor of the
building and were not aware that there was a basement below
them. The arsonist had set the fire in the basement, not on
their level. They were knocking down small fires on the
upper floor, unaware that another crew was confronting a
large body of fire, one level below them. The crew in the
basement, however, was not applying any water because they
thought the first due crews were attacking it from the
opposite side and they did not want to have opposing hose
streams.
When the crews on the upper level left the building to
replace their air bottles they thought that they were
suppressing the main body of fire. Conditions were
improving, and only "spot fires" remained. Unfortunately,
they did not make any progress reports over the fire ground
frequency indicating this situation. If they had, the crew
in the basement would probably have realized that there was
a "disconnect" of some type because of the growing fire that
they were facing. After replacing their air bottles, the
first-in crews re-entered the building on the upper level.
Thirty-two (six?) minutes into the fire the floor collapsed,
plunging four fire fighters into the basement where they
were killed.
Another vivid example of a breakdown in communications
occurred in Hackensack, New Jersey, where two fire fighters
died in a collapse inside a bow-string truss building. They
were trapped inside the building when the roof collapsed,
and attempted, numerous times, to radio their position to
the incident commander. While civilians and police officials
could hear the transmissions over their scanners, neither
the incident commander or the fire department dispatchers
could hear the fire fighters. Calls were made by telephone
to the fire department dispatchers to report that there were
fire fighters trapped inside the building attempting to
radio for help. This information was finally relayed to the
incident commander, but the two fire fighters died before
they could be rescued.
When an officer fell through a fire-weakened floor in
Washington, D.C., the investigators believe that he
attempted to radio his position to the incident commander
(IC). However, the IC never heard the transmission, nor did
the dispatch center. One of the possible reasons cited in
the official report was the lack of a fire ground frequency
dedicated to the incident. The frequency that was being used
was subject to interference, or "bleed over" from other
radio frequencies and incidents. Also, the incident
commander had to simultaneously monitor and communicate on
two separate frequencies. Besides the fireground channel,
the other frequency was the city's primary dispatch
frequency that was continuing to dispatch units to other
incidents throughout the city. This created a confusing and
distracting operating environment.
Freelancing
Communications is not the only part of a fire ground
operation that can break down and contribute to a fire
fighter fatality. In several incidents, the lack of an
established accountability system that allowed fire fighters
to operate independently, or to "freelance," has contributed
directly to other tragedies.
In Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, three fire fighters died in
the basement of a home when they became trapped and
disoriented during a fire. All three ran out of air, and not
until some time later was it realized that they were even in
the building. Another similar episode occurred in Branford,
Connecticut, where the fire fighters did not realize that
one of their members was missing and still inside of the
fire building where the roof had collapsed.
There are two basic reasons for an accountability system.
First, to reduce "freelancing,:" everyone who is operating
on the fire ground must have a specific assignment before
entering a structure or beginning any fire fighting
operations. The second is to be able to identify if any fire
fighters are missing or overdue. Fire departments have
instituted various systems to identify their personnel and
to ensure that ongoing accountability checks are conducted.
For example, the Phoenix Fire Department has instituted a
system where a PAR, or personnel accountability report, is
verbally transmitted over the radio on a regular basis. This
ensures that everyone in the chain of command, from the
first-due officer up to the incident commander is actively
involved in the accountability function.
Building construction
An understanding of the type of building construction
that fire fighters are dealing with can also be critical. A
number of fire fighters have died when a building
constructed of light-weight wood trusses have collapsed upon
them. Branford, Connecticut; Chesapeake, Virginia; and
Hackensack, New Jersey, just to name a few, were all
buildings with wood trusses that failed catastrophically,
and either dropped the fire fighters into the fire, or
collapsed upon them, trapping them within the building. Time
and time again fire fighters are being killed in these types
of buildings, which makes one wonder if the lessons of the
past are being learned.
Construction hazards certainly are not limited just to
trusses. In the Seattle fire, the building was constructed
of heavy timbers throughout, except for one critical area
where a short "cripple wall" had been constructed out of 2
inch by 4 inch wood supports. This wall, which supported the
section of floor where the four fire fighters were
operating, was weakened by the fire and failed. In turn, it
caused the floor section it was supporting to fall downward,
dropping the four fire fighters into the fire area.
Fire Fighter Health
One of the biggest killers of fire fighters every year is
not related to factors such as communications, building
collapse, or freelancing. Forty percent of the deaths that
occur annually are because of heart attacks.
Fire fighting is a tremendously strenuous task. The fire
fighter can be taken from a complete resting state and
within minutes be thrust into a dangerous, complicated
environment where they are expected to perform at a
demanding physical level. Placing such stresses upon an
individual repeatedly can take its toll.
Some fire departments have realized that there is a need
to use a preventive strategy to minimize the impact that
these stresses have upon the individual and to identify fire
fighters who are at risk for cardiac related problems.
Physical fitness programs, life style education, and regular
physicals are all part of a total health and safety program
that can be used to reduce the potential for a
cardiac-related fatality.
Some of these deaths can be avoided with an effective
medical evaluation program. In the NFPA report on 1997
firefighter fatalities the authors stated:
"The information clearly shows that a vast number of the
firefighters who died of heart attacks and strokes had
serious, pre-existing medical conditions. More often than
not, the condition was known, at least, to the victim. We
need to acknowledge their conditions, and we must act to get
those in danger off the fire ground." [Fahy, R; LeBlanc,
P; Washburn, A; NFPA Journal, Vol 92, No. 4 (July/August
1998)]
Risk/ Benefit analysis
After taking all of these factors into consideration,
there is one more step that must be taken before people are
placed in "harm's way." Is it even necessary to fight the
fire?
The overriding reason that fire fighters do their job,
day in and day out, is to save lives. If there is a life in
jeopardy, fire fighters place themselves at tremendous risk
to save those in danger, a risk that is to be applauded.
However, should they be placed at risk for a building
that is known to be vacant? Is it worth a fire fighter's
life to save some property? The answer is an unequivocal
"no." However, we see the instances over and over again
where fire fighters have died in fires where it is clearly
known that there are no lives at risk. Instead, lives were
placed at risk by putting fire fighters into a burning
building to protect the property.
It is critical that the incident commander, as part of
the fire ground strategy, ask the basic question: should
they even be inside of the building? Is the potential
benefit worth the risk to the fire fighters? Is progress
being made on the fire, or is it time to pull back, protect
the fire fighters and let the building go? If the owner
didn't feel it was necessary to properly protect the
property from fire, then why should fire fighters be placed
in danger to protect it?
Solutions
We have made tremendous strides in reducing the number of
fire fighter fatalities from a high of 171 people in 1978 to
94 in 1997. Through better protective clothing, apparatus
design, improved fire ground operations and safety the
number of deaths have dropped significantly. However, there
is much more that can still be done. Where can one go for
guidance?
All of these factors mentioned in this article are
covered within documents published by the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire
Department Occupational Safety and Health, NFPA 1582
Standard on Medical Requirements for Fire Fighters,
and NFPA 1561 Standard on Fire Department Incident
Management System, for example, cover a broad spectrum
of issues, ranging from fire station safety to fire ground
accountability systems. These documents, and others, have
become recognized as the current state-of-the-art practice
in the United States. They provide an excellent framework
for improving the level of fire fighter safety in many
aspects of their jobs.
---------------
Ed Comeau is the principal writer for writer-tech.com, a
technical writing firm. He was previously the chief fire
investigator for the NFPA, a fire protection engineer for
the Phoenix Fire Department and a fire fighter for the
Amherst Fire Department. He can be reached at ecomeau@writer-tech.com.
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